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United States Department of State
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(A7) fm

September 8, 1993

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MEMORANDUM
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TO: AF - Prudence Bushnell
FROM: AF/C - Arlene Render *gl*
SUBJECT: Talking Points On Rwanda For Your Teleconference w/NSC;
Thursday, September 9 at 5 PM

In preparation for your Sept. 9 teleconference with Dick Clarke (NSC) on Rwanda and Liberia, we have prepared the following update on the status of efforts to establish a multinational peacekeeping force in Rwanda.

We are forwarding a separate memo for your Sept. 10 meeting with Herve de la Batie, the French Embassy Africa-watcher.

UPDATE ON PROGRESS OF UN ASSESSMENT TEAM:

Discussion

Per Kigali 3188 and USUN 4265 (attached), the UN assessment team which visited Rwanda August 19-26 is in the process of finalizing its draft report (whose delivery to the UNSYG is expected within the next week). In a conversation with Embassy Kigali before departure, the team leader did not specify the precise size of the force he envisions, or the cost of maintaining it for 22 months; but he did call for "reasonable assets which would make it possible for the UN--and donors--to push the Rwandans hard to stick to their proposed timetable."

In terms of the PKO's mandate, mission, and duration, the team's main recommendations--which Embassy Kigali believes reflect the team's conscientious work on the ground and so should be taken seriously--are expected to be as follows:

-- The peacekeeping operation should be entirely under UN auspices, though it would include several other components (OAU, French, inter alia);

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-- Deployment should be in several phases:

1) This is the most critical phase, lasting at least three months, in the recon team's view. The commander needs to be named and at least some troops should be on the ground by Sept. 10 (the target set by the Arusha Accord). Obviously, the parties already recognize that without a UNSC resolution, such a result is impossible and the target date cannot be met. They have therefore agreed to defer formation of the transitional government and concentrate on lobbying the UN and donors to support the PKO.

2) The second phase would begin when a UN force of sufficient size to conduct disengagement/demobilization arrives in country, and would last approximately nine months. Troop levels would peak during this phase, which would last until force integration was complete.

3) Once integration is complete, the PKO troops would start to leave; if all went well, only an observation force would stay in country through the rest of the 22-month political transition.

-- The OAU troops would essentially "hold the fort" until the UN PKO arrived, at which point the OAU contingent would either be withdrawn or folded into the UN operation. Some OAU personnel might be seconded to key positions of the UN command to gain experience for future OAU-commanded PKO's, but there would be no separate OAU command structure.

-- The operation would have at least four components: a force to manage the disengagement/demobilization activities; military observers for the demilitarized zone; a civilian police component; and a humanitarian assistance operation to assist with displaced/demobilized soldiers and returning refugees.

Talking Points

- o -- We understand that the UN reconnaissance team which visited Kigali last month is about to issue a report recommending deployment of a UN-commanded multinational peacekeeping force in three phases.
- o -- While we will, of course, reserve judgement until we see the team's specific findings--especially specific estimates of troop numbers and costs--our sense is that we should be able to endorse them in principle. Many details remain to be worked out, however.

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FRENCH POSITION ON PEACEKEEPING FORCE:

Discussion

Per USUN 3985 (attached), the original French proposal on peacekeeping/demobilization in Rwanda (presented to our UN Mission on Aug. 17) had three major components:

- 1) The force would comprise approximately 1,000 troops, with 500-600 to be deployed in Kigali and the remainder elsewhere in the country. The peacekeepers in Kigali must be UN troops, not OAU (those outside the capital could be OAU);
- 2) The force must be deployed simultaneously, not in stages;
- 3) A 20-man political observer mission could precede the UN PKO, but it should not be conceived as having "political significance" (a term left undefined).

Since then, the French have shifted their approach, and now propose linking the Rwanda and Liberia peacekeeping forces (USUN 4265, attached). They have also begun to press us and USUN hard for a response to their Aug. 17 proposal (outlined in USUN 3985, attached).

Talking Points

- o -- The GOF has stipulated a number of conditions before it will withdraw its troops and permit the deployment of UN peacekeepers; chief among these is UN command of any OAU forces. The French withdrawal, in turn, must happen before the RPF will agree to join the transitional government, demobilize, and integrate its forces with the government's.

U.S. POSITION ON PEACEKEEPING FORCE:

Discussion

The original French proposal is very similar to AF's draft mission statement, which we have not been able to clear with the interagency group yet, due primarily to JCS's resistance to new peacekeeping operations. (The Belgians will not deploy any troops of their own, but we anticipate that they would financially support any peacekeeping force we and Paris back.)

Our original draft proposal called for non-UN (read OAU) troops to be folded into the UN force in Kigali, but the GOF and the GOR have rejected their inclusion, since they view the OAU forces as pro-RPF partisans. In addition, France's overall figure of 1,000 troops is higher than our own projection of the forces required (though our estimate is not conclusive).

The new AF/C team believes we should go along with the French proposal that the Kigali force be composed entirely of UN troops.

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Talking Points

- o -- Clearly, there are several aspects of the French plan which still have to be resolved, such as pace of deployment, troop levels, and command structures.
- o -- Nevertheless, it is our view that we should accept the French proposal to station only UN peacekeepers in Kigali.
- o -- A possible compromise could be to have 500 UN troops in Kigali and 125-250 (possibly including OAU forces) elsewhere, for a total of 625-750 troops in country.

STATUS OF FUNDING SOURCES:

Discussion

AID is currently processing our apportionment request for \$1.8 million in ESF (derived from Liberia fallout funds) to be used for peacekeeping/demobilization in Rwanda. We recently picked up some disturbing signals that the funds might be reallocated or rescinded, but AF/EPS (Gene Young) has confirmed with AID/DP that the disbursement is still on track (at least as of now). However, until AID's finance people finish the apportionment paperwork (which they are doing), the funds are still vulnerable to rescission. We will continue to press them.

Talking Points

- o -- We have submitted the necessary apportionment request for the \$1.8 million in ESF we have been seeking for peacekeeping/demobilization in Rwanda. However, until AID actually completes the required paperwork, the funds are theoretically still subject to rescission.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PEACEKEEPING PRIORITIES IN AFRICA:

Discussion

As noted in AF's August 12 memo to D (attached), we regard the proposed Rwanda PKO as our third highest ESF priority (after Djibouti and Liberia). The funds will come from a reprogramming of FY 89 Liberia ESF not targetted for rescission.

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Talking Points

- o -- We continue to believe, as we said in our August 12 memo to D, that rapid deployment of a credible international peacekeeping force will help assure security so that a new coalition government can be formed and the parties can begin the process of disarmament, force integration, and demobilization.
- o -- Without rapid deployment of peacekeepers, the entire peace process might well unravel, with severe--and costly--consequences for Rwanda (and, almost certainly, Burundi and other neighboring countries).

BACKGROUND (SITUATION ON THE GROUND):

The GOR and RPF agreed Sept. 4 to defer formation of a broad-based transitional government (which was originally envisioned to be in place by mid-September) in the absence of a neutral multi-national peacekeeping force. Instead, the two sides plan to send a joint mission to New York (and possibly Washington, Brussels, and Paris) the week of Sept. 13 (no firmer dates available yet) to press for implementation by the UNSC of a resolution to provide for a PKO.

The overall situation in the country remains calm but tense. However, the Sept. 5 bombing of a Kigali restaurant frequented by several opposition party leaders, which killed one person and injured several others, is a disturbing reminder of the potential for bloodshed if we are unable to move ahead soon on the peacekeeping operation.

Attachments: As stated

SECC 3043 9/8/93
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